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 Introduction 
 The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of 1792–1815 
were amongst the longest and the most intense conﬂ icts ever 
experienced in Europe: for a similar scale of destruction and 
brutality, one would have to look back to the Thirty Years War of 
1618–48 and to the world wars of the twentieth century. The 
Napoleonic Wars of 1803–15 alone destroyed ﬁ ve million lives, 
which matches the eight to ten million slaughtered during the 
First World War, if the overall size of the European population is 
taken into account. The French Revolutionary Wars of 1792–1802 
wasted a further two million lives. The intensity of the violence 
was such that  one ﬁ fth of the 3,372 European battles fought 
between  c. 1490 and 1815 occurred between 1792 and 1815. The 
conﬂ icts were also global in their reach: although not habitually 
given the name ‘world war’, they had truly worldwide 
repercussions which made a lasting mark across the earth. 
 The ﬁ gure who casts his distinctive shadow across this period is 
Napoleon Bonaparte, adored and demonized both then and since 
in equal measure. His meteoric rise from minor nobility in 
Corsica, where he was born in 1769, to become the single most 
powerful ruler in Europe would not have been possible without 
the French Revolution of 1789. Trained at the military academy at 
Brienne, then at the École Militaire in Paris, he took a commission 
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in the artillery in 1785. From his Corsican background Napoleon 
carried a clannishness that led him to advance the interests 
of his family throughout his career—but only for so long as they 
served his own political power: while Napoleon could justly be 
accused of nepotism, his aspirations were not dynastic, but rather 
he aimed at satisfying his drive for power. He therefore removed 
family members from ofﬁ ce when they challenged him or failed to 
meet his expectations. As a young man, he absorbed the classics, 
identifying strongly with Alexander the Great, as well as the 
enlightened ideas of the age, including eighteenth-century notions 
of patriotism and political reform. Bonaparte was also a seething 
knot of resentment and frustration, nourishing an impulse for 
violence which verged on the sadistic. He was an ‘outsider’ without 
connections in French society, disadvantages which drove him 
harder. His violent outbursts may have stemmed from his brutal 
upbringing by domineering parents and from a bitter 
competitiveness with his siblings. He could be charming in his 
relationships with individuals, but he brooked no opposition to his 
desires and ambitions, a characteristic that he later transferred 
into politics and diplomacy. Bonaparte was a master 
propagandist: as a general in the French revolutionary armies, he 
deftly crafted an image of himself as a military hero and genius. 
He was, above all, an opportunist ( see Figure  1 ). 
 Historians have debated Napoleon’s policies during the wars: was 
he trying to integrate Europe, unifying it by reforming its social and 
political structures? Or was the Napoleonic Empire simply a system 
of conquest aimed only at the exploitation of Europe’s people 
and resources? The historian Paul Schroeder argues that there was 
an ideological vacuum at the heart of Napoleon’s domination of 
Europe: it was a criminal enterprise seeking power for its own sake, 
matched only by the Nazis: ‘Hitler did it for the sake of an 
unbelievably horrible ideal; Napoleon for no underlying purpose at 
all.’ The central problem in this interpretation was Napoleon 
himself: no matter how hard the other European powers tried 
to accommodate him, Napoleon simply did not—could not—accept 
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limits to his power, which explains why he was never able to 
stabilize his European empire and why the wars continued until its 
ﬁ nal destruction. While far from absolving Napoleon of blame, this 
book will seek to nuance such views. 
 The very scale of Napoleon’s ambitions, it has been argued, 
distinguished the Napoleonic Wars from their eighteenth-century 
precursors. As the historian Charles Esdaile has argued, even the 
 1. David’s painting shows that the heroic myth of Napoleon was 
already well formed by 1800. In reality, the First Consul crossed the 
mountains on a mule 
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leaders of the French Revolution set strategic limits to their 
expansionism. This is true, but just as Napoleon was a creature of 
the French Revolution, so the Napoleonic Wars of 1803–15 were 
rooted in the French Revolutionary Wars of 1792–1802. A 
ten-month peace separated the two conﬂ icts and they shared 
many of the same causes and issues, so it is natural that historians 
should treat them as one, great overarching conﬂ agration, the 
‘French Wars’. The continuity across the period is given explicit 
recognition by the fact that, although there were in fact not two 
but seven separate wars, they are customarily counted by the 
successive alliances formed against the French, from the First 
Coalition in 1792 to the Seventh that ﬁ nally destroyed Napoleon’s 
ambitions in 1815. Collectively, the wars spilled out across Europe, 
from Ireland to Russia and from Scandinavia to the Balkans, 
but, in their imperial reach, they also meshed with conﬂ icts across 
the world, in the Middle East, India and South-East Asia, at 
points along the African coast, and in the Americas. 
 This book acknowledges some stark differences between the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, but it treats the 
‘French Wars’ as a whole, since a full understanding of one is 
difﬁ cult without an awareness of the other. While accepting that 
aggressive French expansionism, whether French Revolutionary 
or Napoleonic, was the single most important reason for the 
agonizingly long protraction of the carnage, it argues that it is not 
the full explanation. The entire series of conﬂ icts had causes that 
went far beyond any single factor, and which were beyond the 
control of any one ruler. Rather, it is argued here that, as French 
power surged across Europe from 1792, it worked on long-term 
tensions in international politics which also reached boiling point. 
The wars, in other words, were not just about French 
expansionism or Napoleon’s ambition, but represented a perfect 
storm in which a range of European crises came together. 
 One of the reasons the wars lasted for so long and the French were 
so hard to defeat was that France’s opponents could not or would 
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not focus all their military efforts on victory over the French: they 
were either distracted by other crises, or bent on exploiting the 
international meltdown in the pursuit of their own, habitual 
strategic goals. It follows from this that the French Wars were not 
an ideological conﬂ ict between the French Revolution and 
Napoleon on the one hand and the old regime powers of Europe 
on the other, but originated in the deep, structural problems in 
eighteenth-century international politics, while the belligerents 
were motivated primarily by such objectives as dynastic expansion 
and strategic security. The ﬁ rst three chapters seek to demonstrate 
all this,  Chapter  1 by exploring the causes of the wars and 
 Chapters  2 and  3 by narrating the course of the conﬂ ict between 
1792 and 1815. Yet the denial of ideology as a primary cause of the 
conﬂ ict and its painful prolongation does not mean that it was 
unimportant in other ways. The warring nations mobilized their 
peoples with powerful rhetorical, symbolic, and material appeals 
to their loyalty, their commitment to the social and political order, 
and their religious beliefs. So if the French Wars were not truly 
ideological in their origins (although surely the inﬂ ammatory 
rhetoric on both sides did not help soothe matters), they did 
become ideological in the ways in which states tried to motivate 
their people.  Chapters  4 and  7 explore these issues of ideology and 
reform: how the structures of the French revolutionary state 
managed to fuel France’s war effort and how its opponents 
responded through reform and seeking ways of mobilizing their 
own publics in defence of the old order. These chapters sandwich 
in two others, 5 and 6, which describe the experience of war at 
the ‘sharp end’, for soldiers, sailors, and civilians: these views from 
the front line and at the grassroots act as a counter-balance to the 
ﬁ rst three chapters, which look at the wars very much from 
a strategic and diplomatic perspective. The book concludes by 
discussing the long-term impact of the war to show that we 
are still living with its legacy today. 
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